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Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone? 
 
Cass R. Sunstein
* 
 
Abstract 
 
  Recent scientific innovations, and proposed legislation, have raised questions 
about the nature of the constitutional right to reproductive  freedom, and in particular 
about whether there is a constitutional “right to clone.” This essay urges that as a 
matter of substantive due process, rationality review is probably appropriate, and that 
restrictions on both reproductive and therapeutic cloning would and should survive 
constitutional scrutiny. At the same time, many of the arguments for banning both 
forms of cloning are based on ignorance, myths, and speculation. It is extremely 
important to distinguish between reproductive and nonreproductive cloning, and it is 
equally important to distinguish among the various rationales for banning each. Some 
of those rationales have some, but others, including some of the most influential, are 
exceedingly weak. 
 
 
  As currently interpreted, the Constitution protects a range of rights involving 
marriage, bodily integrity, and reproduction. Does the Constitution guarantee the right 
to clone?  
 
  The question is not as fanciful as it might appear.
1 Cloning is a possible method 
for “reproduction.” For some people, cloning would undoubtedly be the preferred 
choice. Among this group, some would choose cloning on the ground that it is the 
only way to produce children with some genetic connection to them. For such people, 
the potential value of cloning should not be understated. And because reproduction is 
involved, the individual right to choose might well be thought to fall within the 
doctrinal protection given by Roe v. Wade
2 and other cases.
3 At the same time, it is 
not clear that the government can offer constitutionally adequate grounds for 
interfering with a presumptively protected right. Some of the most common 
justifications seem ignorant or speculative, and others could be taken care of through 
narrower means, falling short of a flat ban on cloning. Indeed, the justifications for 
banning cloning might well seem, at first glance, to be weaker than the justifications 
for banning abortion, which involves the intentional destruction of what many people 
consider innocent human life. If government cannot ban the intentional destruction of 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of 
Political Science, University of Chicago. This essay is a written version of the keynote luncheon address 
for the Hastings Law Journal symposium on human cloning, held in January 2002.  
1 See John Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1371, 1441-42 (1998). 
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
3 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US 438 (1972); Carey v. 
Population Servs.. 431 US 113 (1973). 2   
human life, why -- it might be asked -- is government allowed to forbid the intentional 
creation of human life? 
 
  Notwithstanding these points, I will argue here that under existing law, there is 
no constitutional right to clone for reproductive purposes, and indeed that the 
argument for such a right is quite weak under the law as it now stands. I will also 
argue that there is no constitutional right to clone for therapeutic purposes, though the 
analysis must be quite different from that in the reproductive context. In the process of 
engaging the legal issues, I will offer a few more general remarks as well. Some of 
those remarks involve the appropriate judicial posture in cases involving “substantive 
due process.” I will suggest that it is desirable for courts to be extremely cautious in 
extending the reach of cases that do not involve an element involving inequality or 
some other kind of failure from the democratic point of view. Judicial caution is 
justified in light of the complexity of the underlying scientific issues and the existence 
of a reasonable debate over the questions of policy and value. These are institutional 
points about the value of a general posture of judicial deference in a situation of this 
sort. 
 
  But some of my remarks bear on the general question whether government 
should, in principle, ban reproductive and therapeutic cloning. I do not mean to 
resolve those questions here, but I will suggest that many of the most commonly 
offered arguments are extremely weak, resting as they do on a mixture of ignorance 
and confusion. With respect to nonreproductive cloning, the argument for a 
presumptive constitutional right is strained under the precedents; but ironically, the 
government’s justifications for intruding on freedom of choice are very weak indeed. 
Here as elsewhere, we should distinguish sharply between the legal question and the 
political question. The suggestion that there is no constitutional right to clone does not 
say whether  a reasonable legislature would ban the practice of cloning; and here we 
shall see many reasons for doubt. At the very least, we should distinguish between the 
strongest justifications, now involving the doubtful safety of the procedure, and the 
weaker justifications, based on mistakes of fact or simple distaste. 
 
I. Reproductive Cloning: Is There a Presumptively Protected Right? 
 
  For purposes of substantive due process, the first question is whether the right to 
clone counts as a fundamental right, one with which the government can interfere only 
to protect a “compelling” interest. If there is no fundamental right, the government is 
required merely to show a “rational basis” for its action, a much easier burden to 
meet.
4 I begin with the use of cloning technology for purposes of reproduction. 
 
A.  A Puzzling Pattern 
 
  This is not the simplest question to answer. The reason is that that the Court has 
not—to say the least—given clear criteria for deciding when a right qualifies for 
special constitutional protection. The cases leave a great deal of ambiguity and the 
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doctrine lacks much coherence.
5 There are two common ways of reading the cases. 
One reading is that the Court has issued a firm “this far, and no more” and is unwilling 
to recognize additional fundamental rights unless they find specific and extremely 
strong recognition in Anglo-American traditions. This is the argument that Chief 
Justice Rehnquist appeared to accept for a majority of the Supreme Court in 
Washington v. Glucksberg.
6 Of course this approach would not treat cloning as a 
presumptively protected right.  The other reading is that the cases should be taken to 
establish a presumptive right to noninterference with decisions that are “highly 
personal and intimate,” at least if those decisions involve  choices about sexuality and 
reproduction. This approach might well require strong government justification of any 
interference with an individual decision to clone. I explore the two approaches in 
sequence.  
 
B. Due Process Traditionalism 
 
  On occasion influential Justices and the Court as a whole have said that 
fundamental rights, under the due process clause, qualify as such largely because of 
their origins in Anglo-American traditions, understood at a level of considerable 
specificity.
7 This was a theme of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in 
Glucksberg,
8 though Justice O'Connor's separate and narrower opinion draws its status 
into doubt. A central goal of due process traditionalism is to discipline judicial 
discretion and to draw on views that are time-honored and therefore unlikely to be 
idiosyncratic.  
 
  Let us for the moment assume that due process traditionalism is correct – that it 
describes the appropriate approach to the due process clause. If the right to clone must 
emerge from such traditions, the case is simple: There is no such right. The right to 
clone is not something that Anglo-American law traditionally protects. Of course  we 
could say that the absence of a tradition of protection is not relevant, because the 
relevant technology is so new. But if such a tradition is a necessary condition for 
constitutional protection, there can be no right to clone.  
 
  At the same time, there are severe problems with defining fundamental interests 
solely by reference to tradition, specifically described. The first problem is that many 
of the Court's cases cannot be understood in purely traditionalist terms, and hence the 
traditionalist understanding of the privacy cases fits poorly with existing law. Roe v. 
Wade is the clearest example; there is no clear tradition establishing a right to 
abortion. But this is not true only of abortion. From the standpoint of tradition, a large 
number of the Court’s cases make little sense. The cases establishing a right to 
contraceptives outside of marriage do not vindicate a longstanding tradition.
9 Nor is 
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Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion 
of Powell, J.); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
8 521 U.S. 702, 710. 
9 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs.. 431 US 113 (1973). 4   
there any general right to marry within Anglo-American traditions; hence Loving v. 
Virginia,
10 striking down a ban on interracial marriage on due process clause, and 
Zablocki v. Redhail,
11  recognizing a fundamental right to marry, fit poorly with due 
process traditionalism. Traditions, taken at a level of specificity and as brute facts, 
explain few of the key cases, and hence traditionalism does not make sense of existing 
law. 
 
  Should the Court consider its own decisions doubtful and use traditionalism in 
the future notwithstanding its inconsistency with past decisions? This course has 
considerable support within the Court; it is suggested by the Court's opinion in 
Washington v. Glucksberg, the plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,  and 
Bowers v. Hardwick.. And such a course might be deemed reasonable if traditionalism 
was extremely appealing in principle and if the alternatives were unacceptable. 
Perhaps a firm “no more!” would make sense despite its failure to fit with existing 
law; the Court's occasionally cavalier treatment of its own precedents implies a 
judgment of this sort. But if we assume that at least some kind of substantive due 
process is legitimate,
12 as all of the Justices appear to assume, we will find large 
problems with using traditions, narrowly and specifically conceived, as the sole source 
of rights under the due process clause. To be sure, such a use of tradition does help to 
discipline judicial discretion, and that is an important gain. And if traditions were 
extremely reliable as sources of rights, and if judges thinking more independently 
about the appropriate content of rights were systematically unreliable, due process 
traditionalism might be justified on balance. That is, due process traditionalism might 
be justified as a way of minimizing the costs of decision and aggregate judicial errors 
even if it were quite imperfect as a source of rights. 
 
  But this is not a very plausible view, for there is no reason to think that 
traditions, understood at a level of great specificity, are systematically reliable or so 
close to systematically reliable as to exclude a somewhat more reflective and critical 
judicial role.
13 Anglo-American traditions include a great deal of good but also 
significant confusion and injustice (consider, for example, bans on racial 
intermarriage); it is sensible for courts to engage in at least a degree of critical scrutiny 
of intrusions on liberty even if those intrusions do not offend tradition. Nor is there 
sufficient reason to think that judges will inevitably do very badly if they think 
critically about rights.  
 
  Of course judges should be very cautious about rejecting judgments made by 
elected officials; of course judges should avoid hubris in examining the past. Certainly 
it is plausible to think that judges should generally proceed incrementally and in good 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 388 US 1 (1967). 
11 434 US 374 (1978) 
12  Actually the whole idea of “substantive due process” is quite doubtful as a matter of text and history.  
But we might see that idea as doing the work of the privileges and immunities clause, which could 
plausibly have been used for an enterprise of this kind. See Charles Fairman, “Does the Fourteenth 
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?,” 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949). 
13 I try to defend this view in Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2001). 5   
common law fashion from previous decisions. It also makes sense to say that 
substantive due process should be used sparingly, because of its uncertain textual basis 
and because of the unreliability of judicial judgments about which rights should 
qualify as fundamental. Understandings of this kind provide important constraints on 
judicial power under the Due Process Clause. But at the very least it is appropriate for 
courts to ask whether the interest said to qualify as a fundamental right is, in principle, 
at all different from rights that have been sanctified by tradition. If, for example, there 
were no relevant difference, in principle, between a traditionally-unrecognized right to 
clone and (let us suppose) a traditionally-recognized right use contraceptives within 
marriage, courts should not say that the latter is constitutionally protected and the 
former is not. 
 
C. Reproduction and Sexuality 
 
  If tradition is not decisive, what is the source of fundamental rights for purposes 
of substantive due process?  
 
  1. A False Start. It is tempting to resort to terms such as “intimate” and 
“personal”; but these terms provide little help. They tend to be conclusions 
masquerading as analytic devices. In any case, some of the cases deny protection to 
interests that seem highly intimate and highly personal; consider both Hardwick,
14 
refusing to recognize a right to homosexual sodomy, and Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas,
15 refusing a recognize an associational right to enable people to live together.. 
Thus the Court's cases refuse to accept the view that intimate and personal decisions 
deserve constitutional protection as such. Putting previous cases to one side, we can see 
that some decisions that seem intimate and personal are not strong candidates for 
constitutional protection. Consider the decision to work longer than the maximum hour 
laws allow in order to provide for one's family, the decision to take medicines or drugs 
of a certain sort, the decision to marry one's cousin or aunt, or for that matter the 
decision to commit suicide. There is good reason to think that the Constitution does not 
protect these decisions, however intimate and personal they seem. Thus a reference to 
“intimacy” or “personal” decisions is insufficiently unhelpful.  
 
  2. Reproduction and Sexuality. But the Court could find a narrower principle 
of some appeal, and considerable consistency with the cases, if it said that there is a 
presumptive right against government intrusions into the decision how and whether to 
produce children. This idea might be invoked to explain both Roe v. Wade and cases 
involving governmental efforts to prevent people from diminishing risks of pregnancy. 
The suggested standard also has the advantage of distinguishing Bowers v. Hardwick, 
the Georgia sodomy case, on the ground that there is no prohibition on the regulation of 
sexual conduct if decisions about pregnancy and childbirth are not involved. In any 
event, the standard seems to provide a sufficient if not necessary condition for 
constitutional concern. There do not appear to be any cases that fail to find a 
constitutionally protected interest in cases in which the standard is met. 
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  3. Problems and Difficulties. It would not be frivolous to take the precedents in 
this way.
16 But there are two problems with the argument.  
 
  The first is that it is not clear why the right to decide how and whether to 
produce children should have this special status, if other rights, such as the right to 
choose physician-assisted suicide and the right to engage in consensual sexual activities, 
do not. Surely it is true that decisions about reproduction  -- about whether and how to 
reproduce -- are central to individual autonomy. But many other decisions seem equally 
central, or at least not less central, and those decisions do not receive special 
constitutional protection. Why should reproduction be singled out? The question 
suggests that the cases involving reproduction and contraception may not, in fact, only 
involve those issues, and that they may be marked by another feature, one that involves 
sex equality. Perhaps issues of that kind also helped motivate the Court. A ban on 
abortion has disproportionate effects on women, to say the least; and when a law forbids 
the use of contraceptives, women are likely to face especially strong adverse effects, in 
the form of an involuntary pregnancy. Indeed, several members of the Court has 
acknowledged that Roe v. Wade owes something to equality concerns,
17 and it does 
seem clear that bans on contraception have disproportionate effects on women.  
 
  This equality concern does not appear to be present with bans on cloning.  Do 
such bans treat women as such worse than men? Do such bans treat any disadvantaged 
group especially badly? To be sure, it would be possible to urge that people who are 
disabled, in the sense that they lack the ability to produce children in the standard 
fashion, are distinctly harmed by bans on cloning. But whenever the government 
imposes barriers to use of some medicine or medical technology, there is a 
disproportionate burden on those who believe that they need it. By itself that burden is 
not enough to create a serious constitutional issue. 
 
  The second problem in the argument is that it defines the relevant interests very 
broadly, and in a way that is not at all compelled by the cases. People might have a right 
to decide whether to abort, and whether to use contraceptives, without  also having a 
right to choose any available  means to have, or not to have, a child – even if that means 
is, for some people, the only realistic means. We should agree that it would be 
presumptively unacceptable for the government to ban certain couples from having 
children,  or to impose a one-child policy on the nation. We should also agree that the 
government may not require people to have children, and indeed that government may 
not bar women from availing themselves of what is, for most people, the usually 
indispensable means of preventing the birth of unwanted children (such as 
contraception and abortion). But none of this means that there is a presumptive right to 
do whatever might be done to increase the likelihood of having, or not having, a child: 
to enter into surrogacy arrangements, or to use in vitro fertilization, or to attempt to 
clone a child. The central point is that a ban on cloning, or on surrogacy arrangements, 
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without opinion sub nom. Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7
th Cir. 1990). 
17 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 933 (1992). 7   
leaves open numerous other channels by which most people may bear a child. If 
numerous channels remain open, perhaps the government need not face the strongest 
possible burden when it merely closes off one. 
 
  The point should not be overstated. There are many means to prevent unwanted 
childbirth (I omit the details); abortion and contraception are hardly the only methods. 
And for some people, cloning might be the only feasible way to produce a biological 
offspring. For imaginable plaintiffs in an imaginable case, a ban on cloning is 
effectively a ban on reproduction in the biological sense. It would certainly not be 
ludicrous to say that as a matter of constitutional law, the state has to produce a strong 
justification for intruding on that choice in cases in which it is the only realistic option. 
Indeed there is reason to question a doctrine that would apply strict scrutiny to a ban on 
“natural” reproductive practices while applying only deferential review to a ban on new 
technologies. But where there is no problem of inequality, courts would probably not, 
and should probably not, demand the kind of overwhelming justification that is required 
in some cases. Indeed it seems sensible to understand the Court’s precedents as 
reflecting special circumstances: the potentially large intrusion on women’s bodies that 
is entailed by a ban on abortion or contraception, and the fact that when such bans are in 
place, women’s equality is at risk. 
 
II. Reproductive Cloning: State Justifications 
 
  I now turn to the arguments that might be offered to justify a ban on 
reproductive cloning. These arguments can be taken in two ways. First, they might be 
an effort to show that the government has a rational basis for the ban – all that is 
required if, as I believe,  a fundamental right is not involved. Second, they might be 
invoked to show that government has a compelling interest in banning reproductive  
cloning – the showing that is required under strict scrutiny. My basic conclusion is that 
most of the arguments, and perhaps even all of them, are sufficient to satisfy rational 
basis review. I also urge that if a compelling interest must be shown, the most stringent 
standard is met by the significant risk that cloning would result in a greater deal of 
illness, suffering, and death. 
 
A.  Three Weak Arguments 
 
  1. Moral Repugnance. In a widely discussed essay, Leon Kass has pointed to 
what he calls the “wisdom” of repugnance, and urged that disgust or repugnance is by 
itself a sufficient reason to ban a practice.
18  There is an interesting claim in the 
background here. Perhaps repugnance, even of the visceral sort, reflects a kind of 
wisdom and rationality that are superior to readily accessible arguments. Is moral 
repugnance, felt by many people, enough to meet the government’s burden? 
 
                                                 
18 See Leon Kass, The Wisdom in Repugnance, in Leon Kass and James Q. Wilson, Cloning: For and 
Against 1998). 8   
  The Supreme Court has indicated that it is, at least in the context of a prohibition 
of homosexual sodomy.
19 And undoubtedly it is true that “disgust” sometimes captures 
a sound moral intuition, and that on reflection, we will find that moral repugnance is 
based on good grounds. Sometimes repugnance is fully rational. But standing by itself, 
and not subject to reason or scrutiny, moral repugnance seems to be a weak basis for 
intruding on a human choice. Moral repugnance has been invoked for many bans that 
could not easily withstand analysis; consider bans on racial intermarriage or 
masturbation. In the context of cloning, moral repugnance might well be a response to 
vaguely remembered science fiction stories or horror movies, or to perceptions based on 
ignorance and confusion (as in the idea that a clone is a complete “copy” of the original, 
or a “copy” that is going to be evil). The real task is to see if moral repugnance can be 
defended, not simply asserted. 
 
  But these points remain to be translated into constitutional terms. If we are 
speaking of strict scrutiny, moral repugnance by itself cannot be sufficient; Loving v. 
Virginia
20 is enough to establish the point.  Moral repugnance must be explained, not 
merely asserted. If rational basis review is at work, and if the task is merely to describe 
current law, moral repugnance does seem adequate under the authority of Bowsher v. 
Hardwick. But there is every reason to be uneasy with this conclusion. Indeed, in the 
context of discrimination against the mentally retarded, offense and repugnance were 
expressly found to be irrational and hence constitutionally inadequate.
21  To uphold a 
ban on reproductive cloning, we should seek some other rationale, even under the 
rational basis test. 
 
  2. Lessening the Worth of Individuals and Threatening Individuality. 
Would cloning lesson the worth of individuals? Would it make the clone less of an 
individual? The person whose genetic materials were used? Would it diminish the 
uniqueness of human identity? Some people appear to think so. No less an authority 
than Ian Wilmut has said, “I think that each child should be treated as an individual; and 
if you have chosen to make a child, who is a copy of someone who is already here, you 
can’t possibly treat that person as an individual.”
22 My speculation is that for many 
people, the idea of “copying” human beings is unacceptable, simply because of what it 
seems to do to the individuals involved. 
 
  Here too, however,  the argument seems to dissolve on reflection. Wilmut is 
making an empirical claim (“you can’t possibly treat that person as an individual”), and 
taken as such, the claim is very weak. Identical twins are genetically identical, and the 
existence of identical twins does not lesson the worth of individuals, or make anyone 
less of an individual. If John and Jim are genetically the same, they are likely to be 
similar in many ways for that very reason; but they will not be identical, simply because 
they will have different experiences, and experiences affect personality and 
development. It is not necessary to set out controversial claims about the precise mix of 
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20 388 US 1 (1967). 
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genetic endowments and environment in order to make the point. The individuality of 
the person whose DNA is used to create a clone would not be compromised by the fact; 
nor would the individuality of the clone be affected as a result.
23 Indeed, the difference 
between cloning and ordinary reproduction should not be overstated on this count. 
Many children are extremely close, as a genetic matter, to one or another parent.  
 
  If we are speaking of strict scrutiny,  a ban on cloning cannot plausibly be 
defended on this ground. Simply because rational basis review is so deferential, the 
argument from individuality might be sufficient to support a ban. But even here, the 
argument is extremely shaky. 
 
  3. Genetic Diversity. A species does well if it has a large stock of genetic 
diversity. Some people who are concerned about human cloning fear that if it occurs, 
the stock will be diminished – making the world, or parts of it, a bit like the English 
royal family. If this is a plausible threat, wouldn’t it be legitimate for a state or a nation 
to ban cloning for that reason alone? 
 
  On reflection, this too is an extremely weak argument, certainly insufficient to 
satisfy strict scrutiny, and probably insufficient to satisfy rational basis review. The 
reason is that it defies belief to suggest that cloning would become so popular as to 
reduce, in any significant way, the existing level of genetic diversity.  
 
B.  Three Stronger Arguments 
 
  1. Protecting against Suffering and Early Death. The first and simplest 
justification is that in light of the current state of medical technology, it is highly likely 
that cloned human beings would face serious medical problems -- leading, in many 
cases, to serious illness and early death.
24 The underlying risks include high rates of 
miscarriage, deformed children, premature aging, and high rates of cancer and other 
diseases.
25 There are possible risks to the mother as well.
26  
 
  Let us assume that this pessimistic account of the current situation is accurate as 
a scientific matter. If it is true, it should be easily sufficient to satisfy rational basis 
review. Indeed, it is probably sufficient to satisfy even the most stringent standard of 
review, though under that standard, the scientific claims will be investigated closely. If 
the claims are taken to be adequate – as prominent groups have concluded
27 -- then a 
ban is likely to be upheld even if the consequence is to prevent the development of 
technology that would reduce the relevant risks. By hypothesis, the practice of cloning 
would lead to much suffering and many deaths. The government would seem to have 
strong reason to prevent that practice. Compare the question of animal welfare. If 
                                                 
23 Below I address  some psychological complications. 
24 See Report of the California Advisory Committee on Human Cloning, Cloning Californians? (Jan. 11, 
2002); Report of the National Academy of Sciences (2002).  
25 See id; see also Robertson, supra note, at 1411. 
26 See Report of the California Advisory Committee, supra note, at 23-24. 
27 See id. 10   
scientists are experimenting with animals in a way that will lead to a great deal of 
suffering, the government is certainly allowed to intervene, even if the experiments 
would have many benefits too. 
 
  There is, however,  a possible counterargument. Roe v. Wade held that the 
interest in protecting fetal life is not sufficient to override the right of privacy. Suppose 
that many or most of the early deaths would involve fetuses, not viable human beings. 
Is it not clear, after Roe, that the interest in protecting fetal life cannot overcome the 
right to choose? The simplest answer is that strict scrutiny is likely not to be involved, 
and hence the interest in protecting fetal life is indeed sufficient. A slightly less simple 
answer is that in light of current technology, a ban on cloning would protect fetuses, 
young children, and mothers themselves, and hence the question turns out to be easy. If 
we are speaking of strict scrutiny, the best answer is that a ban on cloning is justified as 
an effort to protect not only fetuses, but also people who are actually born. Even if a 
relatively small percentage of clones (10%? 20%?) would suffer in the predicted way, 
the state almost certainly has sufficient reason, as a constitutional matter, to ban the 
practice.  
 
  2. Psychological Harm to the Clone. It is possible to urge that the clone would 
suffer psychological harm, even psychological trauma. Imagine the likely emotional 
state of someone who knows that he or she is genetically identical to someone who has 
already lived a number of years. Perhaps such a person would believe that her future 
course was in many ways preordained – that some possibilities were open and others 
were closed off. If the clone’s genetic equivalent suffered from high blood pressure, or 
diabetes, or cancer, she might believe, with  very good reason, that she would face those 
problems as well. Other problems are more subtle. If the genetically identical parent 
faced a depressing career path, or had unappealing physical features or an unpleasant 
smile or laugh, or was badly overweight,  it might prove difficult – far worse than 
distressing – for the clone.  
 
  These are plausible concerns, though they do involve a degree of speculation. 
We do not know whether in most or many cases, the psychological harms would be 
serious. Identical twins appear to do very well notwithstanding  the fact that 
psychological harm could be predicted. To be sure, the case of human cloning would be 
different, simply because of the age difference between the people involved; the harms I 
am discussing would be a product of seeing a life that has run much of its course. But 
biology is not (entirely) destiny, and we could easily imagine young people concluding 
that even if they are genetically equivalent to one or another parent, or some other living 
person, their path is hardly foreordained. Is cloning so radically different, on this count, 
from ordinary reproduction? I am not sure. 
 
  As far as the Constitution is concerned, however, the issue will be resolved by 
selection of the governing standard. If the rational basis test is involved, the arguments 
from psychological harm are undoubtedly sufficient. If strict scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard, the speculative nature of the argument is probably decisive, and the ban could 
not be defended on this ground alone. 11   
 
  3. Use and Exploitation of Human Beings. Of the stronger arguments for 
banning reproductive cloning, the third is the most interesting. Imagine a situation in 
which cloning was freely permitted – in which individuals could clone themselves, and 
in which people interested in children with a certain genetic endowment could assure 
themselves of that very endowment. If a family wanted a terrific athlete, it could obtain 
a genetic equivalent of, say, Michael Jordan; if it wanted a terrific musician, it could 
obtain a genetic equivalent of, say, Bob Dylan; if it wanted a terrific scientist, it could 
obtain a genetic equivalent of, say, Ian Wilmut; if it wanted a terrific philosopher, it 
could clone John Rawls. Why would this be objectionable?  The reason is that people 
would be treating their children-to-be as means, with prearranged agendas, rather than 
as ends, to seek their own path. Someone who seeks a clone of Michael Jordan might 
well have a particular plan in mind for that individual. So too with anyone who has 
sought, and been able, to choose people with one or another genetic endowment. In 
such cases, the parents would be carefully programming their children’s future, and 
likely, perhaps, to keep the program in mind throughout childhood. 
 
  Of course this is not altogether different from ordinary life. Many parents have 
particular plans for their children. Many parents are insistent on those plans. Sperm and 
egg donations depend, in part, on perceptions about genetic endowments. But the 
particular programming that I am now discussing cannot be achieved. Perhaps parents 
who produce clones will, too much of the time, treat their own children not as ends but 
as means.
28 If we see a significant increase in that kind of treatment, there would seem 
to be considerable reason for concern. 
 
  Is this an adequate justification, by itself, for banning cloning? If the rational 
basis test is at work, it certainly is; and for reasons suggested above, rational basis 
should be all that should be required here. But if we probe a bit more deeply, we will 
uncover some complexities. The argument depends on a speculation about what people 
would do, and we do not know if the speculation can be supported. Perhaps most people 
would clone themselves, or would seek clones of strangers who meet some genetic 
minimum, and would not attempt to clone particular individuals with particular traits 
and career paths. Perhaps this would be rare. Probably those who cloned people with 
particular characteristics would, almost all of the time, treat their children with love and 
respect. Here as elsewhere, strict scrutiny is not easy to satisfy, and here as elsewhere, a 
widespread argument against human cloning seems to rest on weak grounds. 
 
III. Therapeutic Cloning 
 
  Therapeutic cloning presents quite different issues.
29 Here there is no effort to 
create actual human beings. Children are not involved. My basic conclusion is that it is 
not at all easy to argue that there is a fundamental right to engage in therapeutic 
cloning – indeed, the argument for that right is weaker, as a legal matter, than the 
argument for a right to engage in reproductive cloning. On the other hand, the 
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justifications for banning therapeutic cloning are relatively weak – much weaker, in 
fact, than the strongest justifications for banning reproductive cloning. To understand 
the constitutional issues associated with a ban on therapeutic cloning, a brief 
background is in order. 
 
A. A (Very) Little Science 
 
  Here, in brief, is how therapeutic cloning would work. An embryo would be 
created and allowed to grow for a short period, perhaps fourteen days or less. Its stem 
cells would then be extracted and grown into human issue or a complete human organ 
for transplant. The result of the process would not be a human being, but a piece of 
nerve tissue, or a replacement organ, or a certain amount of skin. The goal would be to 
grow replacement organs from a sample of someone’s DNA.  
 
  It is not clear if and when therapeutic cloning will succeed, but the potential 
benefits are large. In theory, people could receive perfectly matched replacement 
organs, with little or no danger of rejection of the transplant. Insulin-secreting cells 
could be used to treat diabetes; nerve cells could be used for Parkinson’s disease or 
strokes; liver cells could be used to repair damaged organs. There would be no need to 
wait for the death of a donor.  Nonreproductive cloning could also produce significant 
benefits for knowledge and research, with eventual medical advances as well. 
 
B. No Fundamental Right 
 
  Is there a fundamental right to engage in therapeutic cloning? The issue is quite 
different from the case of reproductive cloning, for childbirth is not in any sense 
involved. Hence the precedents that might support a right to reproductive cloning 
cannot be invoked here. For constitutional purposes, the central  question is whether 
there is a presumptive right to select medical treatments. Those who seek to engage in 
therapeutic cloning might be protected if the Constitution recognizes such a 
presumptive right. We can imagine patients, or derivatively scientists and researchers, 
urging that the right to privacy includes a presumptive right to noninterference with 
choices among medical treatments that are crucial to people’s well-being.   
 
  At first glance, however, the mere statement of the question serves as an answer. 
No Supreme Court decision suggests that there is any such right. Indeed, daily practice 
argues against its existence. The Food and Drug Administration controls the kinds of 
medicines that doctors may prescribe and that patients may choose. It would be 
fanciful to attack those controls on constitutional grounds. Now perhaps it could be 
urged that in the relevant cases, the FDA is attempting to protect people against fraud 
or deception, or against the effects of their own ignorance, and that these are not the 
grounds for forbidding nonreproductive cloning. Probably this is true. But the key 
point is that the FDA is not required to justify its decisions in the terms of strict 
scrutiny, on pain of constitutional invalidation.  
 13   
  We have seen that it is not implausible to argue, on the strength of Roe v. Wade, 
that the government would be required to produce a strong justification for any effort 
to ban in vitro fertilization or surrogacy arrangements. But nothing in Roe v. Wade 
supports to right to choose medical treatments. Recall that the Court has upheld a ban 
on physician-assisted suicide, applying rational basis review.
30  If people do not have a 
right to choose death, it is unlikely that they have a right to a particular set of medical 
experiments that might ultimately benefit them. Or consider another analogy: 
scientific experiments on animals. Must the government justify a limitation on such 
experiments in the terms of strict scrutiny, simply because important medical advances 
might result? This is most doubtful. No court has ever suggested that strict scrutiny 
will apply to government efforts to protect animals in the process of experimentation. 
 
  I do not mean to suggest that the area lacks complexities. Perhaps it could be 
argued that while there is no right to die, there is a right to live, and that when a 
patient seeks to use medical technology that is the (only) means of saving his life, that 
the government should be required to produce an unusually convincing justification. 
This is not entirely implausible. But it would go well beyond the existing precedents, 
and it would also have the disadvantage of requiring careful judicial oversight of 
numerous decisions by the FDA. One of my general themes has been the value of 
judicial deference, under the due process clause, in the face of complex disputes of 
fact and value. A posture of deference makes best sense here as elsewhere.
31 
 
C. Elusive Justifications 
 
  What interests support a ban on therapeutic  cloning? The answer is not simple. 
Those who object to therapeutic cloning tend to believe that personhood begins at 
conception, and that the state should not use “persons” for the benefit of others. Is this 
an adequate justification? In the case of rational basis review? 
 
  It might be tempting to say that this justification is inadequate after Roe v. 
Wade. In Roe, after all, the Court held that the interest in protecting fetal life was not 
sufficient to justify a ban on cloning. But the temptation should be resisted. Roe holds 
only that the interest in protecting fetal life is inadequate to override the woman’s right 
to choose; it does not hold that the interest is illegitimate or weightless.  It seems clear 
that government can make it a crime to kill first-trimester fetuses, whether  they are 
inside women’s wombs or in the laboratory; and to justify such a prohibition, it is not 
necessary for government to say that first-trimester fetuses are human beings.  
 
  But what is the reason for forbidding nonreproductive cloning? Those who 
object to therapeutic cloning may be unsure whether  personhood begins at 
conception, but may nonetheless press two points. First, they may think that the use of 
human pre-embryos is itself a moral wrong. Second, they may urge that the use of 
human embryos could tend to have subtle but ultimately corrosive effects on human 
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values, in a way that will lead to an assortment of problems. If rational basis review is 
at work, these points should be sufficient to support the ban as a matter of 
constitutional law. I do not mean to endorse the claims in principle. Why is it a moral 
wrong to use pre-embryos in the suggested way? Animals are frequently used as 
means; most of these uses are lawful; and at least some of them seem morally 
acceptable.  Do pre-embryos have such a strong claim to protection? Or consider the 
view that human values will be corroded by nonreproductive cloning. Why, exactly, 
should this be feared, if nonreproductive cloning is not itself morally wrong for the 
purposes and in the circumstances I am describing? The empirical claim seems most 
doubtful. 
 
  Perhaps the real argument is that early embryos have the “potential” to become 
human beings, and are worthy of moral concern for that reason.
32 But this argument 
seems weak too. Sperm cells have “potential,” and  (not to put a fine point on it) most 
people are not  especially solicitous about them. If scientists will be using and cloning 
embryos only at a very early stage when they are just a handful of cells (say, before 
they are four days old), there appears to be no good reason for a ban. 
 
  Perhaps the strongest ground for banning nonreproductive  cloning has nothing 
to do with these points. Perhaps it is a different sort of empirical claim, to the effect 
that a ban on nonreproductive cloning is a necessary means for enforcing the ban on 
reproductive cloning. It might be feared that if nonreproductive cloning is permitted, 
some people, at some point, will inevitably use the pre-embryos in the forbidden way, 
so as to produce, or to try to produce, children. Here too there are many doubts. If 
reproductive cloning is a crime, should we really fear that nonreproductive cloning 
would be used for that by hypothesis unlawful end? But if rational basis review is at 
work, this justification should be sufficient. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks on Cloning and Substantive Due Process 
 
  This has been a lawyer’s essay, exploring the constitutional issue, not the 
question of policy. I have argued that bans on cloning are constitutional, not that they 
are a good idea. 
 
  With respect to substantive due process, I have offered a general claim. The 
Court should be most reluctant to invoke the due process clause to strike down 
legislation on substantive grounds. Where the Court has acted, it has usually done so 
because of an implicit understanding that the case did not simply involve substantive 
due process. In cases involving sexuality and reproduction, a question of sex equality 
was also involved. The argument for a cautious approach to the due process clause 
depends in part on a belief that the idea of “substantive due process” is awkward as a 
matter of text and history. But it also depends on a belief in judicial fallibility, 
especially in the domain of complex facts and contested values.  Simply because of its 
complexity, the area of cloning is a prime arena for judicial deference. Unless there is 
some problem in the process that led to the law under review, courts should be hesitant 
                                                 
32 As argued I Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future (2002). 15   
to interpose their own views, at least outside of the most egregious cases. Tradition is 
indeed relevant here, at least as a way of undertaking the inquiry into egregiousness; 
an unprecedented intrusion is likely to be especially egregious. Tradition does not 
exhaust the substantive content of the due process clause. But the intrusion marked by 
bans on cloning does not rise to the level of intrusions the Court has marked for 
invalidation; and that is sufficient for my basic conclusion here.  
 
  I have argued that there is no constitutional right to clone human beings for 
reproductive purposes, and hence a ban on cloning, for those purposes, would and 
should be upheld. I have also argued that there is no constitutional right to clone 
human beings for therapeutic purposes. In both cases, the Constitution does not create 
a presumptively protected right -- and hence the government is not required to show 
more than a rational justification for its actions. In both cases, the government has 
such a justification. In the case of reproductive cloning, the best argument is the least 
sectarian – that a ban is necessary to protect against human suffering. In the case of 
therapeutic cloning, a ban is far harder to justify. But so long as rationality review is at 
work, it is probably sufficient to say that the ban on therapeutic cloning is a means of 
making the ban on reproductive cloning effective. 
 
  At the same time, the analysis has shown that many of the standard objections to 
human cloning are extremely weak.  Some of those objections depend on ignorance 
and confusion, or on a kind of half-remembered message from old science fiction 
movies. By itself, repugnance should not be, in principle, an adequate justification for 
law. An unintended byproduct of a discussion of the constitutional issue may be to 
take some small steps toward something that is long overdue and much needed in the 
political arena: A disaggregation of the issues that are involved in reproductive and 
nonreproductive cloning, and a separation of the diverse, sometimes strong, but 
sometimes implausible grounds that are invoked on behalf of statutory bans in both 
domains. 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Cass R. Sunstein 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 csunstei@midway.uchicago.edu 
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